US Army Engineer District, Chicago
111 North Canal Street
Chicago, IL 60606
11 JAN 13

OPERATION PLAN 2013-02
FEB/FEMA COOP EXERCISE

Time Zone Used throughout the Plan: Central Standard Time (CST)

1. Reference. Chicago District Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP), December 2012.

2. Situation. Downtown Chicago has been hit with cyber terrorism resulting in limited communications. The Federal Executive Board (FEB) will be conducting a COOP exercise on 16 JAN 13, with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) supporting as the control cell for the FEB. Each participating Federal agency reacts by moving their command and control to their Continuity of Operations Site to ensure continuation of essential operations.

a. Enemy Forces. Terrorists have created a situation whereby downtown Chicago communications has been limited.

b. Friendly Forces. Chicago District staff who are members of the Emergency Relocation Group (ERG) who will be participating in the COOP exercise.

3. Mission. On order, the Chicago District ERG will travel to the North Area Office (NAO) to ensure continuation of essential operations during any crisis, and that the safety and well being of employees are maintained.

4. Execution.

a. Commander's Intent.

(1) The expanded purpose of this COOP exercise is to validate internal communication capabilities and systems in a safe, low impact manner to the remainder of the district. This exercise is focused on the ERG and Crisis Management Team (CMT) to feel comfortable with the capabilities we have in place, validate lines of communication with FEMA V, and identify shortcomings that still might exist in our COOP setup and procedures.

(2) Key Tasks Include:

(a) Establish COOP site at NAO upon notification.

(b) Validate all communications systems with LRC EOC, LRD EOC, and FEMA V.

(c) Conduct site visit to FEMA V COOP; validate access cards.

(d) Exercise employee notification via Blackboard System.

(e) Conduct spot familiarization training with the CAT members that would staff the EOC.

(f) Build standard Commanders Update Slide deck (generic) for any Emergency Management efforts.

(g) Conduct After Action Review to establish additional capabilities for the NAO COOP site.

(3) Endstate: LRC ERG is comfortable with internal and external communications from the COOP; we have identified any procedural or capability gaps at the COOP; the ERG feels comfortable with establishing command and control of district duties and is poised to coordinate ESF#3 operations in conjunction with FEMA V and HQ.

b. Concept of Operation. Emergencies, or potential emergencies, may affect the ability of the District to carry out essential functions. Due to a cyber terrorist activity, communications are limited in the Chicago Loop area and the District ERG must deploy to its COOP site. Positive personnel accountability throughout all phases of emergencies, to include relocation to the COOP site, is of utmost importance.

c. Tasks to Subordinate Units.

(1) Emergency Relocation Group (ERG). Since office space at the NAO is at a premium and support capabilities are limited, the ERG size will be restricted to personnel who possess the skills and experience needed for leading the execution of essential District operations. Annex A lists those members of the ERG.

(a) Members of the ERG will deploy to the COOP site in order to arrive at the NAO NLT 0900 on 16 JAN 13 utilizing their own transportation. The NAO is located at 620 Barry Road, Bldg #158, Great Lakes, IL. You will need a Base vehicle sticker, which can be obtained by going to the visitor center located near the main gate. You will need your driver's license, proof of insurance and vehicle registration, and CAC card. ERG members with government-issued laptops and cell phones are encouraged to bring them.

(2) Non-ERG District Staff.

(a) All personnel not directly involved in the FEB/FEMA COOP exercise will perform normal business as usual activities such as working at their office, TDY, annual leave, sick leave, etc.

(b) As part of the COOP plan, during a COOP event the ERG utilizes the entire NAO building. During the exercise the ERG will minimize impacts to NAO by setting up in the conference room and only utilizing other space as needed.

d. Coordinating Instructions. This exercise is mainly intended to test the district's ability to execute its COOP plan, test the various forms of communication equipment we have, verify connectivity with our computers, and account for 100 percent of district employees from a remote location.

(1) Once the FEB notifies the district that the exercise is in progress, Blackboard Connect will be used to notify employees on what to do on 16 JAN 13. The ERG will be instructed to deploy to the COOP site by 0900 on 16 JAN. All other employees will be instructed to perform normal business as usual activities on that day. The Blackboard message will make it clear that only ERG will deploy to the COOP. The FEB Participant Guide states that communication should use the statement "TEST EXERCISE: Chicago Continuity Challenge – Cyber Attack 2013 TEST EXERCISE" to prevent potential misinterpretation.

(2) All ERG members will hook their laptop into the LAN at the NAO to verify connectivity to the Internet, CEFMS and other sites they may utilize.

(3) SAT phones and the secure telephone at the NAO will be tested. A telephone call to the FEMA COOP site will be verified for connectivity (847-688-3050).

(4) All other upgraded equipment recently purchased for the COOP site will be tested to verify it works, such as the desktop VTC system, cable television, and computer hubs.

(5) A dress rehearsal with the ERG for the COOP exercise will be performed on 07 JAN 13.

(6) During the COOP exercise the ERG will review what their roles and responsibilities are during this type of condition and how the district would sustain itself from the COOP site for extended periods of time while continuing to provide services to our customers.

(7) After the exercise is complete conduct an AAR and implement any corrective actions needed.

5. Sustainment. N/A

6. Command & Control.

a. Signal. The LRC Communication plan will be executed to establish horizontal and vertical communications during the exercise. Electronic network systems, telephone, cellular, and satellite will be utilized to establish necessary communications.

b. POC. The POC for this exercise is Scott Vowinkel, telephone number 312-846-5471.

FREDERIC A. DRUMMOND, JR.
COL, EN
Commanding

OFFICIAL:
Scott G. Vowinkel
Chief, Readiness Section

ANNEXES
Annex A (Emergency Relocation Group)
Annex B (COOP Site Floor Plan)
Annex C (Exercise Timeline)
Annex D (FEB/FEMA Participant Guide)

ANNEX A Emergency Relocation Group and External Contacts

1. Emergency Relocation Group (ERG). Persons in the following table are the minimum staff required at the COOP site to assist the Commander in the daily operation of the District. Substitutions and absences specific to the 16 Jan 13 exercise are noted in the table.

DISTRICT ELEMENT	NAME	OFFICE TELEPHONE	CELLULAR TELEPHONE
District Commander	COL Drummond	312-846-5300	312-823-4364
District Deputy Commander	LTC Schreiner	312-846-5301	312-543-5096
Programs, Planning & Project Management Division	Roy Deda	312-846-5302	312-730-6148
Technical Services Division	Linda Sorn	312-846-5400	312-860-0120
Legal Counsel	Kimberly Sabo *Kevin Jerbi*	312-846-5350 312-846-5352	312-404-0156
Construction Operations Branch	Shamel Abou-El-Seoud	312-846-5470	312-860-0121
Design Branch	Joe Schmidt	312-846-5410	312-714-2600
Resource Management	Monique Gray	312-846-5360	312-576-3646
ACE-IT	Gabrielle Reed *Oscar Oliva and/or Mark McCrorey*	312-846-5382 312-846-5386 312-846-5381	312-623-8644
ULA	Jessica Kotleski	312-846-5324	773-885-8856
Contracting Branch	Regina Blair	312-846-5371	312-316-1011
Public Affairs Office	Lynne Whelan	312-846-5330	312-404-0145
Safety Office	Pete Flanagan	312-846-5340	630-292-4771
Security Office	Leslie Bush (not attending)	312-846-5305	312-860-0080
CPAC	Joseph Tober	312-846-5310	312-608-2357
Readiness Section	Scott Vowinkel (not attending)	312-846-5471	312-860-0117
Readiness Section	Brigid Briskin	312-846-5475	312-810-8260

2. External Contacts. Persons in the following table are contacts at agencies that the District will likely communicate with during a COOP event.

AGENCY	NAME	OFFICE PHONE
USACE - LRD	Bob Burnside	513-684-3089
USACE - LRL	Donald Walker	502-315-6920
USACE - MVR	Rodney Delp	309-794-5230
IEMA Region 3	Bob Flemming	815-433-7161
IEMA Region 4	Jimmy Thompson	847-294-4717
Chicago OEMC	Main Number	312-746-9111
FEMA Region V	24-hr Watch Center	312-408-5365

ANNEX B
COOP Site Floor Plan



ANNEX C - COOP Exercise Timeline

Time	Activity
Tuesday, January 15, 2013	
1700	Alert Notification Drill
Wednesday, January 16, 2013	
0900	Start of Exercise, arrive at NAO
0915	Major Event #1, T+5 day discussion
1000	LRC communication test (with CAT at District EOC)
1030	Major Event #2, T+10 day discussion
1100	ESF#3 Briefing
1200	Lunch, communication tests continue as needed
1300	Major Event #3, T+20 day discussion
1400	Hot wash

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Chicago Continuity Challange-Cyber Attack Full Scale Continuity Exercise

Participant Guide

Chicago FEB Full Scale Exercise
FEMA Region V

January 16, 2013

FEMA

ANNEX D TO LRC OPORD

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CONTENTS

HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

1. The title of this document is the *Chicago Continuity Challenge – Sound Response 2013 Full Scale Exercise Participant Handbook*.
2. The information gathered in this Participant Handbook is *UNCLASSIFIED*. The control of information is based more on public sensitivity regarding the nature of the exercise than on the actual exercise content. Reproduction of this document, in whole or in part, without prior approval from the exercise planning team is discouraged.
3. For more information, please consult the following points of contact (POCs):

Jean Brown
Executive Director
77 W. Jackson, Suite 2115
Chicago, IL 60604
312-353-6790
Jean.brown@gsa.gov

Exercise Director
Rolando Rivero
Regional Continuity Program Manager
DHS-FEMA Region V
536 S. Clark St.
Chicago, IL 60605
312-408-5590 (voice) 312-408-5222 (fax)
Rolando.Rivero@fema.dhs.gov
www.fema.gov

EXERCISE BRIEF

Chicago's Continuity Challenge – Cyber Attack Full Scale Exercise (FSE) is a continuity of operations focused exercise designed to establish a no-fault learning environment for participating organizations to practice and examine their continuity plans and procedures. Agency personnel will begin play on January 16, 2013 at 9:00 am from the agency's exercise location following the STARTEX (Start Exercise) order from the Exercise Control Cell. Exercise play is expected to terminate at 2:00 pm with an ENDEX (End Exercise) message from the Control Cell. An intra-agency hot wash will be conducted for the FSE participants immediately following the ENDEX.

This FSE will allow key planning personnel, such as continuity planners, IT personnel, or executive leadership, to execute a simulated cyber scenario in an informal environment in order to assess their continuity capability. This guide provides the necessary information to observe or participate in this FSE.

PURPOSE

The purpose of this exercise is to test the Federal Community's ability to activate, mobilize, and commence initial emergency Continuity of Operations under guidance outlined in Federal Executive Branch (FEB) Federal Continuity Directive FCD-1, Federal statutes, Executive Orders, and Agency plans. This is a NO-FAULT, non-attribution exercise. Findings will not be forwarded to outside agencies, higher headquarters, state and local agencies, or the media unless done so by individual agencies. This exercise will focus primarily on activation of your Continuity of Operations Plan(s) from your continuity facilities in response to a Cyber Attack that affects the Chicago metropolitan area. The exercise will also heavily examine reconstitution procedures.

SCOPE

The Chicago Continuity Challenge-Cyber Attack 2013 exercise is designed as full scale exercise consisting three major events and will be followed by a hot wash. The exercise will start at 9:00 am, and will wrap up with a hot wash.

EXERCISE OBJECTIVES

The FSE is focused on improving understanding of continuity of operations, identifying organizational strengths as well as areas that require improvement. The following objectives were selected by the exercise planning team:

- Exercise continuity communications
- Evaluate continuity plans and procedures
- Assess reconstitution plans and capabilities

EXERCISE STRUCTURE

The Chicago Continuity Challenge-Cyber Attack 2013 Master Scenario Events List (MSEL), included in this guide, will present three major events that affect your agency. The major events are followed by a series of injects and discussion questions that will prompt agencies to consider their established plans and procedures against the scenario. Exercise play will begin at 9:00 am with Agency Lead Controller reading the Scenario Background section for the first major event. The exercise will proceed according to the events outlined in the MSEL, in accordance with established plans and procedures.

Once provided with the event, Agency Lead Controller will evaluate the agencies. Interaction among agency colleagues and other agencies and organizations is strongly encouraged to promote information sharing.

EXERCISE RULES

The following are the general rules that govern exercise play:

1. The exercise is designed to test procedures and systems, not individual performance.
2. Operations and actions by participants should be consistent with information outlined in their Continuity of Operations Plan(s). Again, the system is being tested, not people.
3. Use of equipment, telephone numbers, radios and radio frequencies should be consistent with the Continuity of Operations Plan(s).
4. Agencies should record exercise traffic. This information will be used to record lessons learned plus provide evidence that the exercise took place. It is recommended that agencies set up a separate email for exercise traffic. When responding to emails with follow-on email traffic, be sure to include a separate email address that captures the data and actions taken for future reference in the After Action Review process.
5. All live calls, facsimiles, or emails used during the exercise MUST be prefaced with **"TEST EXERCISE: Chicago Continuity Challenge-Cyber Attack 2013 TEST EXERCISE**" to prevent potential misinterpretation by outside parties.
6. Agencies will conduct play in the exercise from their Continuity Facility or an alternate site.
7. Agencies have the responsibility to write their respective MSEL action items. Each Agency Lead Controller will send out agency-specific MSEL injects along with generic and informational injects; each Agency Lead Controller can determine when to release agency-specific injects.
8. Agencies have the sole responsibility to devise and deliver their action times during the exercise. They must name one person to run their exercise play from the Agency Continuity Facilities or alternate sites. The CWG exercise committee will handle all scenario development. The scenario piece will be given to the Agency Lead Controllers prior to the exercise.
9. All communications messages between agencies and Lead Controllers participating in the exercise are the responsibility of each individual agency to execute.

10. Each participating agency has the responsibility to staff sufficiently the exercise controller/evaluators for its Continuity Facility operations to include an Agency Lead Controller.
11. The Agency Lead Controller will be located at the Agency's Continuity Facility or alternate site. The Agency Lead Controller will deliver the scenario injects to exercise participants via various communications mediums. The Lead Controller is an exercise Trusted Agent, thus is not considered an agency player during the exercise.
12. If agencies want to conduct unscripted play with other agencies, they may call the controller of the agency they want to talk to. That person will forward the call or information to the right person.
13. There will **NOT** be a functional interagency Joint Information Center (JIC) participating in the exercise. Each agency must be prepared to play a press role within the exercise.

Participant Feedback Forms

Each agency will provide a feedback form to the FEB (ChicagoFEB@GSA.GOV), Participant feedback forms will be for agency use only. The form should be returned to the agency facilitator as participants exit the exercise.

Hot Wash

For the hot wash, each agency should conduct a briefing, highlighting the best practices and areas for improvement that were identified. In addition, participants will also have the opportunity to provide general comments on exercise design.

After Action Report

Each agency is encouraged to prepare an After Action Report (AAR) containing lessons learned and a corrective action plan as a result of this FSE. The exercise design team will distribute an overarching AAR to all participants which captures common themes of lessons learned, as well as recommendations for future tests, training, and exercise.

The hot wash and feedback forms will provide the basis for the AAR. When listing areas for improvement, no agency names will be included.

ASSUMPTIONS

Operational Assumptions

1. The primary communications mode for this exercise will be via email activity between the Agency Lead Controller to the Agency Continuity Facility. Phone calls may be used as secondary means to distribute or receive information. Agencies are encouraged to utilize facsimiles and secure communications where possible to ensure the operational status of such devices.
2. At the start of the exercise, all communications and IT infrastructure might or might not be intact and operational. Cell phone towers have a tendency to go down during severe events. Agency Lead controllers might also render them unavailable from time to time to test viability of other methods of communications.
3. All agency Continuity Facilities survive the event and are available.
4. The exercise focus will be response to a Cyber Attack. Other types of threats and secondary damage can adversely affect agency response.
5. Responses are to be based on accepted standards, practices, and policies for agencies.
6. It is to be assumed that Washington always has good communication lines to Chicago to deliver its instructions.
7. Communications with people not participating in the exercise may be simulated or accomplished through role-playing.
8. Responses to action items and inquiries should be accomplished with as much detail as possible and should meet exercise officials' requirements.
9. Participants can expect some limited feedback and interaction with their Agency Lead Controller.
10. Communications initiated by other agencies should be treated with the same level of importance as exercise MSEL or action items.
11. Action items might not flow to participants in a logical chronological order.
12. Agencies are encouraged to conduct meetings of their senior people prior to deployment to the Continuity Facility to discuss what is known about the exercise scenario at that point.
13. Exercise training for participants is each agency's responsibility.

EXERCISE SCHEDULE

Time	Activity
Tuesday, January 15, 2013	
1700	Alert Notification Drill (optional)
Wednesday, January 16, 2013	
0900	StartEx
1400	EndEx
1400	Complete After Action Report (Hot Wash) and submit to ChicagoFEB@GSA.Gov

PARTICIPANT INSTRUCTIONS

Before the Exercise

- Be familiar with your agency's Continuity Plan.
- Review the appropriate emergency plans, procedures, and exercise support documents.
- Be at the appropriate site at least 30 minutes before the start of the exercise, or as directed by the agency exercise controller.
- Read your Participant Guide, which includes information on exercise procedures.

During the Exercise

- Follow exercise rules as described beginning on page 6.

Following the Exercise

- At the end of the exercise, participate in the Agency Hot Wash immediately following the exercise at the exercise location.
- **Complete the Participant Feedback Form.** This form allows you to comment candidly on continuity activities and effectiveness of the exercise. Please provide the completed form to a controller. See page 7 for instructions on feedback procedures.
- Provide any notes or materials generated from the exercise to your controller for review and inclusion in the AAR.

SCENARIO OVERVIEW

Telecommunications services outages throughout the Midwest Region have local telecommunications companies scrambling to find the cause. Incidents are being reported from the entire East North Central Region of Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, and Michigan. Equipment in Local Exchange Carrier (LEC) telecommunication central offices has been impacted and rendered inoperable.

U.S. officials have confirmed that chaos in our region is the result of a cyber-attack. The inconsistent telecommunications services and computer network damage is causing severe problems to the area's infrastructure. Rail service has been suspended and all air traffic in and out of airports has been halted. Transportation is at a standstill due to corruption of traffic signals in major metro areas. Telecommunications and Internet service providers continue to report problems with local and long haul telecommunication infrastructure up and down the Midwest Region. Government agencies in the region and several large private sector companies have stated that their voice and computer networks have effectively been shut down.

The environmental terrorist group Earth Freedom Front (EFF) has claimed responsibility for the cyber-attack. A Joint Law Enforcement Task Force has been created to search for the culprits.

Due to the severity of the cyber-attack, your agency has devolved or relocated to work from your continuity site.

MASTER SCENARIO EVENTS LIST (MSEL)

Major Event #1	
Exercise Time:	9:15am
Scenario Time:	T + 5 days

The Joint Law Enforcement Task Force has arrested six members of the Earth Freedom Front in conjunction with the cyber-attack that we are still reeling from. While reticent to admit to the vulnerability at first, telecommunication industry officials have confirmed that the EFF targeted computer systems, which in turn caused the damage to the telecommunication infrastructure.

Despite the arrests, service disruptions will continue in our area as telecommunications systems are restored. Rail based commuter and freight lines are slowly returning to normal but delays can still be expected.

Authorities say it could still be another week before things fully return to normal. Many local businesses and government agencies are expected to continue operations from alternate locations. It's advisable to check websites, hotlines, or call ahead to make certain any destination in the area is open to the public.

#	Inject	Prompts	Topics
1.1	Headquarters requests an operational status update.	- What is your current operational status? - How would an event of this magnitude impact your organization? - What are your essential functions? - Which, if any, of your essential functions are impacted? - Do you have backup plans or systems? - How will you resume essential functions at your primary site?	Essential Functions Reconstitution Continuity Facility
1.2	Leadership requests a briefing to review the Reconstitution Plan.	- Do you have a reconstitution plan? - At what point in continuity operations do you begin reconstitution efforts? - How will the essential functions continue during reconstitution?	Reconstitution Essential Functions
1.3	Does your staff have the ability to make voice calls and send email traffic from your continuity site?	- Has your agency secured infrastructure at your continuity site to allow staff to perform mission essential functions?	Continuity Facility

1.4	Leadership is requesting a damage assessment of your primary building/essential systems.	- Who is responsible for conducting a damage assessment? - Is there a checklist? - What essential systems, such as IT, timekeeping, etc., need to be in place before the building is reopened?	Continuity Facility Reconstitution
1.5	The Director is requesting a review of communications processes. Your latest employee and stakeholder notification, to inform them of your operational status did not generate a satisfactory response rate.	- How do you provide a report of your alert and notification system/procedure? - Are all employees trained on how to respond to alert and notification messages? - How do you update your communications plan? - What are your backup notification / communications procedures if primary systems are down?	Communications Alert and Notification

Major Event #2	
Exercise Time:	10:30 am
Scenario Time:	T + 10 days
The region is continuing its recovery efforts after the widespread telecommunication outages. There are still parts of downtown Chicago without telecommunication services. Telecommunication officials are working around the clock to repair damages. Telecommunication providers are prioritizing repairs with emergency communications and health organizations as their focus. Full restoration of telecommunication services is not expected for up to a week.	

#	Inject	Prompts	Topics
2.1	Your communications equipment at your primary site was damaged due to the service disruptions.	- How is a damage assessment conducted? - Do you have redundant equipment?	Reconstitution Continuity Facility
2.2	Leadership would like thoughts on reconstitution options from staff.	- Who is responsible for briefing leadership? - Who makes the decision to take back responsibility for essential functions at the primary site?	Reconstitution
2.3	Some equipment needs to be discarded due to damage. These items need to be replaced in order to resume operations.	- What process or policy is in place to acquire new supplies? - Who is responsible for this?	Reconstitution Continuity Facility
2.4	The additional damage assessment discovered that electronic copies of vital files were damaged in the outage and need to be recovered.	- How can you salvage damaged vital records? - Who will you contact for professional restoration?	Vital Records
2.5	Non-ERG members are calling, requesting information. Many are eager to return to work. Leadership would like to know what 'normal' functions can be brought back online before reconstitution is complete.	- What, if any, essential functions can be performed via telework? - What is your telework policy? Is it applicable to all staff, or only ERG members?	Telework Reconstitution Human Capital

2.6	Contractors (IT, custodial, security, admin) want to know when they can return to work.	- How dependent are your essential functions on contract support?	Reconstitution Human Capital
2.7	The Reconstitution Manager needs equipment specifications to purchase new equipment.	- What needs to be submitted or provided to contracting to reconstitute operations? - Is there a list of telecom, equipment, etc. requirements for your agency?	Reconstitution

Major Event #3	
Exercise Time:	1:00 PM
Scenario Time:	T + 20 days

After several weeks of telecommunication outages, AT&T officials reported today that the telecommunications infrastructure is functioning and that voice and date circuits in the greater Chicagoland area have been restored to all customers. Officials, however, warned that the infrastructure was still fragile and asked residents and businesses to have patience if services experience short outages.

Despite this good news, early damage assessments are estimating that the cyber-attack cost the region over three billion dollars. Financial markets suffered the most losses.

Those area businesses, schools, and government agencies that escaped unscathed, have taken steps to prepare their facilities for re-opening. A complete list of agencies that will be open for business tomorrow can be found on our website.

#	Inject	Prompts	Topics
3.1	Your agency has replaced Local Area Network (LAN) equipment and services have come back to operational status but additional short term outages could still impact operations	- How do you reconstitute your operations? - Can you have all your staff members go back to your primary site? - Should you leave a smaller staff at your COOP site?	Reconstitution Continuity Facility Human Capital
3.2	Service has been restored throughout the area. Leadership has decided to close operations at the Continuity Facility.	- How do you close operations at the continuity facility? - How do you prep the site for the next continuity event? - Do checklists or matrices exist to assist in this process?	Continuity Facility Essential Functions
3.3	At what point do you notify your customers, partner agencies, and stakeholders of your decision to return to "normal" operations?	- How do you send this information? - Is your agency aware of the reconstitution efforts of partner agencies?	Reconstitution Essential Functions Communications
3.4	Vital records have been produced/updated while conducting continuity operations.	- How are new vital records transferred from your continuity site to your primary office? - Are paper or microfilm copies of electronic vital records maintained?	Vital Records

3.5	Employees have feedback and suggestions regarding ways to improve operations at the continuity facility and the reconstitution process.	- How are suggestions and comments received and implemented? - What are the procedures that outline the steps for an after-action review of the reconstitution process?	Tests, Training, and Exercises Correction Action Plan

FEEDBACK INSTRUCTIONS

Please carefully review instructions for the collection of feedback forms (Annex A, page 19). The due date for all feedback forms will be **January 17, 2013**. Feedback forms should be sent to ChicagoFEB@GSA.GOV.

Annex A – Individual Exercise Evaluation Form
This form is to be distributed to all participants within your agency. It is recommended that this form be completed by participants and collected during the internal hot wash following the exercise. Agencies have two options for submitting these results:

1. Scan and send all forms in a PDF file.
2. Tally results and send in a summary.*

*Note: Include number of participants/feedback forms counted in the summary so that they can be properly weighted in overall results of the AAR.

Annex B – General After Action Report (AAR)
Each agency is responsible for the submission of one General After Action Report form. Feedback collected from these forms will also be incorporated into the overarching AAR.

Annex C – Agency Specific After Action Report (AAR)
Agencies are not required to submit this form. It is provided for use by each agency for their own internal AAR.

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ANNEX A: INDIVIDUAL EXERCISE EVALUATION FORM

(Please bring to the exercise)

Please fill out form at the end of the exercise. Answers to the following questions are meant to help us improve and enhance Chicago's COOP Working Group (CWG) Exercises. Your answers are confidential. Thank you in advance for your time.

1. How much knowledge of Continuity of Operations Plan(s) and your role during continuity activation did you have prior to exercise? (circle one)

1	2	3	4	5
None of the knowledge	Some of the knowledge	Most of the knowledge	Nearly all of the knowledge	Not applicable

2. How prepared were you for the exercise? (circle one)

1	2	3	4	5
Not prepared at all	Somewhat prepared	Moderately prepared	Completely prepared	Not applicable

3. How did the exercise affect your understanding of Continuity of Operations Plan(s) and your role during continuity activation? (circle one)

1	2	3	4	5
Very negative effect	Somewhat negative effect	Somewhat positive effect	Very positive effect	Not applicable

4. How well did you understand the exercise's objectives listed? (circle one)

1	2	3	4	5
No understanding	Some understanding	Moderate understanding	Complete understanding	Not applicable

5. How well did the exercise meet the stated objectives? (circle one)

1	2	3	4	5
None of its objectives	Some of its objectives	Many of its objectives	All of its objectives	Not applicable

6. How helpful were the exercise materials and information you were provided before and during the exercise? (circle one)

1	2	3	4	5
Not at all helpful	Somewhat helpful	Moderately helpful	Extremely helpful	Not applicable

7. How would you rate the amount of time allowed for the exercise? (circle one)

1	2	3	4	5
Much less time than needed	Somewhat less time than needed	Just Enough time needed	More time needed	Not applicable

8. How well organized was the exercise? (circle one)

1	2	3	4	5
Not at all organized	Somewhat organized	Moderately well organized	Extremely well organized	Not applicable

9. Off-Site Exercise Execution – Please indicate your level of satisfaction with the exercise play and your ability to successfully receive the exercise action items in a timely and accurate manner.

1	2	3	4	5
Not at all organized	Somewhat organized	Moderately well organized	Extremely well organized	Not applicable

10. Considering all of the expectations you may have had about the exercise, to what extent has the exercise met your expectations? (circle one number below)

Falls Short of Expectations — Exceeded Expectations

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

11. What is the most significant thing that you learned from the exercise?

12. What deficiencies in your Continuity of Operations Plan(s) or Continuity planning did you identify?

13. What would you like to see done differently in future exercises?

14. Off-Site Agencies: Please provide additional comments on the off-site exercise execution and your ability to communicate with the exercise staff and on-site agency representatives:

Please write any additional comments in the space below:

Thank you for taking the time to provide feedback.

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ANNEX B: GENERAL AFTER ACTION REPORT (AAR)

(For submission to FEMA for AAR – Submit to CHICAGOFEB@GSA.GOV)

Agency: _____

Exercise Objectives:

Chicago 's Continuity Challenge 2013 Objectives:

1. Testing alert notification and activation procedures for continuity personnel and all other personnel.
2. Demonstrate capability to conduct MEFs from an alternate work location or from a telework location.
3. Demonstrate ability to execute agency continuity plans, including reconstitution and devolution planning.

List any specific Agency Objectives:

General Observations:

1. Comments on exercise design
2. Comments on exercise structure and flow
3. Comments about agency preparation for the exercise
4. General comments about agency participation in the exercise

Agency Strengths Observed:

Agency Weaknesses Observed:

Conclusion:

- Items the agency will take away from the exercise
- How could the exercise be improved?

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ANNEX C: AGENCY SPECIFIC AFTER ACTION REPORT (AAR)

(For agency internal AAR)

Agency:

Exercice Name : Sound Response 2013

Exercice Objectives:

Chicago's Sound Response 2013 Overall Objectives :

1. Testing alert notification and activation procedures for continuity personnel and all other personnel.
2. Demonstrate capability to conduct MEFs from an alternate work location or from a telework location.
3. Demonstrate ability to execute agency continuity plans, including reconstitution and devolution planning.

List any specific Agency Objectives:

Exercise Description:

General Observations:

1. Comments on exercise design
2. Comments on exercise structure and flow
3. Comments about agency preparation for the exercise
4. General comments about agency participation in the exercise

Agency Strengths Observed

1. Continuity of Operations Plans and Procedures
2. Identification, resource, and plan to execute agency mission essential functions (MEFs)
3. Delegations of Authority

4. Orders of Succession

5. Continuity Facilities

6. Continuity Communications

7. Vital Records Management

8. Test, Training, and Exercise (TT&E)

9. Human Capital

10. Devolution of Control and Direction

11. Reconstitution

Agency Weaknesses Observed:

1. Continuity of Operations Plans and Procedures

2. Identification, resource, and plan to execute agency mission essential functions (MEFs)

3. Delegations of Authority

4. Orders of Succession

5. Continuity Facilities

6. Continuity Communications

7. Vital Records Management

8. Test, Training, and Exercise (TT&E)

9. Human Capital

10. Devolution of Control and Direction

11. Reconstitution

Conclusion:

-Specific things the agency will take away from the exercise

-How could the exercise be improved?

Appendix A: Elements of a Viable Continuity Plan

Policy Background: National Security Presidential Directive-51/Homeland Security Presidential Directive-20 (NSPD-51/HSPD-20), dated May 9, 2007, was issued by the President to establish and maintain a comprehensive and effective national continuity capability. The National Continuity Policy Implementation Plan (NCPIP), dated August 2007, provides continuity policy guidance to executive departments and agencies as well as non-Federal entities (including State, Territorial, Tribal, local governments, and the private sector) on identifying and carrying out their Essential Functions to lead and sustain the Nation during a catastrophic emergency. Federal Continuity Directive 1 (FCD 1) provides specific guidance for continuity planning and encourages coordination among all levels of government and the private sector to achieve a comprehensive and integrated continuity capability.

The table below contains the ten elements of a viable continuity plan as specified in FCD 1.

Continuity Element	Description
Essential Functions	Organizational functions and activities that must be continued under any and all circumstances. These functions are derived from the organizations overall functions and missions and, when identified, should be prioritized to ensure the most important, critical functions are properly identified and emphasized, as appropriate. Essential functions are those functions that enable organizations to provide vital services, exercise civil authority, maintain the safety and well being of the general populace, and sustain the industrial/economic base in an emergency.
Orders of Succession	Specify who will succeed key positions, to include leadership and continuity personnel, in the event that primary personnel are incapacitated. Orders should be of sufficient depth to ensure the organization's ability to manage and direct its essential functions and operations.
Delegations of Authority	Specify who is authorized to act on behalf of the agency head or other officials for specified purposes. Generally, predetermined delegations of authority will take effect when normal channels of direction are disrupted and terminate when those channels have been reestablished.

Continuity Element	Description
Continuity Facilities	Alternate locations where leadership and staff may operate during a continuity event. Leadership and staff may be co-located in one facility or dispersed through many locations, connected virtually through communications systems. Facilities must be able to provide survivable protection and enable continued, endurable operations.
Continuity Communications	A robust and effective communications system that provide intra- and interagency connectivity allowing the agency the ability to execute its essential functions at its alternate or other continuity facilities under all-hazards conditions. These systems must support full connectivity, under all conditions, among key government leadership, internal elements, other agencies, critical customers, and the public.
Vital Records Management	Vital records and mission critical systems and databases, to include classified or sensitive data as applicable, necessary to perform essential functions and activities. Each agency continuity program, plan, and procedures should identify and plan for the protection of these records and systems. Agencies should pre-position, and update on a regular basis, duplicate records and databases or back-up electronic media. The agency's Vital Records Program must be reviewed periodically and updated accordingly.
Human Capital	Agency continuity plans should include human capital guidance and procedures for all employees during a continuity event to include procedures for pay, leave, etc. An agency must ensure that its human capital strategies for its personnel are adaptable to changing circumstances and a variety of emergencies, and that these strategies and procedures are regularly reviewed and updated, as appropriate.

Continuity Element	Description
Test, Training, and Exercises	The test, training, and exercising of continuity capabilities is essential to demonstrating, assessing, and improving an agency's ability to execute its continuity program, plans, and procedures. Training familiarizes continuity personnel with their roles and responsibilities in support of the performance of an agency's essential functions during a continuity event. Tests and exercises serve to assess, validate, or identify for subsequent correction, all components of continuity plans, policies, procedures, systems, and facilities used in response to a continuity event. Periodic testing also ensures that equipment and procedures are kept in a constant state of readiness.
Devolution of Control	Devolution is the capability to transfer statutory authority and responsibility for essential functions from an organization's primary operating staff and facilities to other organization employees and facilities who can sustain that operational capability for an extended period. Devolution planning supports overall continuity planning and addresses catastrophes and other all-hazards emergencies that render an agency's leadership and key staff unavailable to or incapable of performing its essential functions from either the agency's primary or alternate facilities. At a minimum, agencies should include the following in their devolution planning: • Identify prioritized essential functions to facilitate their immediate and seamless transfer to a devolution site; • Identify the likely protocols (triggers) that would initiate or activate the devolution plan; • Specify how and when direction and control of organization operations will transfer to the devolution site(s). • List necessary resources (people, equipment, and materials) to perform essential functions at the devolution site; • Establish reliable processes and procedures to acquire resources necessary to continue essential functions and sustain operations for extended periods; • And establish capabilities to reconstitute organization authorities to their pre-event status upon termination of devolution operations.

Continuity Element	Description
Reconstitution	Reconstitution is the process by which agency personnel resume normal agency operations at the primary facility or new facility following a continuity event. Reconstitution involves three main tasks: ▪ Transitioning from continuity status to normal operations after the disruption has passed. ▪ Coordinating and planning for reconstitution regardless of the level of disruption. ▪ Outlining the procedures for a smooth transition from a relocation site to a restored facility.